# **TraceScript Retrieval Integrity**

## **Governing Retrieved Context Before It Becomes Trusted AI State**

**Canonical Public White Paper v1.0**

**Subtitle:**  
Retrieval integrity envelopes, influence control, RAG poisoning detection, canonical conflict checks, filter receipts, and replayable proof for agentic retrieval systems

**Primary contribution:** AI Retrieval Security  
**Secondary contribution:** Context Integrity  
**Tertiary contribution:** A runtime architecture for governing what agents retrieve before retrieved content becomes trusted context, memory, or action basis

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## **Abstract**

Retrieval is not neutral.

When an agent retrieves a document chunk, policy excerpt, ticket summary, or prior conversation, that content becomes **candidate substrate** — it may be shown to a user, summarized, written into memory, cited as evidence, or used to justify external action.

Most systems treat retrieval as a search problem. TraceScript treats retrieval as a **security boundary**.

The question is not only:

Did we find relevant content?

The deeper question is:

May this retrieved trace influence generation, memory, policy, or action — given its source trust, authority, canonical status, poisoning risk, contradiction state, scope, sensitivity, and replay burden?

TraceScript Retrieval Integrity is a runtime module that wraps retrieved content with **integrity envelopes**, filters candidate traces by **allowed influence**, detects **RAG poisoning** and **canonical conflict**, and emits **filter receipts** that bind to the integrity ledger.

Its winning sentence is:

**Retrieved content cannot become trusted context without checks.**

Its core doctrine is:

**Every retrieved trace that may influence generation or action should carry an integrity envelope — and fail closed when poisoning, revocation, or scope violation is detected.**

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## **Keywords**

TraceScript  
Retrieval Integrity  
RAG security  
retrieval integrity envelope  
influence control  
canonical conflict  
RAG poisoning  
retrieval filter receipt  
cross-tenant retrieval  
action-basis eligibility  
safe-to-trust check  
agent memory contamination  
retrieval authority score

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# **1. Problem Statement**

Enterprise AI systems retrieve constantly:

- Vector stores and RAG corpora  
- Policy libraries and knowledge bases  
- CRM records and ticket histories  
- Prior agent turns and summarized threads  
- Vendor PDFs and internal wikis  

Failures appear as:

- **Retrieval poisoning** — adversarial or drifted chunks override policy  
- **Silent authority** — retrieved summaries treated as official truth  
- **Revoked influence** — superseded traces still retrieved and cited  
- **Cross-scope leakage** — customer A context retrieved for customer B  
- **Stale canonicalization** — old policy retrieved to support new action  

These failures occur **before** the agent acts — at the moment retrieval becomes context.

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# **2. Security Boundary**

```text
Candidate traces → influence evaluation → integrity envelope → allowed retrieval set
```

| Stage | Question |
|-------|----------|
| Source classification | What produced this trace? |
| Influence request | What use is requested — working context, canonical memory, action basis? |
| Integrity envelope | What trust metadata wraps this trace? |
| Filter decision | allow · allow_with_warning · exclude · quarantine |
| Receipt | Immutable record of the filter decision |

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# **3. Retrieval Integrity Envelope**

An envelope attaches trust metadata to each retrieved trace:

- source id, type, trust, and authority  
- canonical status and allowed influence level  
- freshness, scope, and sensitivity class  
- poisoning and canonical conflict scores  
- contradiction and revocation state  
- action-basis eligibility and warnings  
- filter receipt reference and replay status  

The envelope answers:

- May this be shown?  
- May it be summarized?  
- May it update memory?  
- May it support external action?  
- May it become canonical?  

**Rule:** No envelope, no trusted retrieval influence.

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# **4. Influence Control**

Retrieved traces carry **allowed influence** levels:

| Level | Meaning |
|-------|---------|
| `none` | Display-only or audit — no downstream influence |
| `working_context` | Ephemeral session context |
| `canonical_memory` | May persist as trusted memory |
| `action_basis` | May support external action release |

The retrieval filter compares **requested influence** against **trace allowed influence**, revocation state, and integrity scores.

Revoked or superseded traces are downgraded or excluded — preventing old policy from supporting new action.

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# **5. RAG Poisoning Detection**

Product-depth runtime evaluates retrieved chunks for:

- poison pattern scores (override language, bypass phrases)  
- retrieval authority score (source trust × canonical conflict)  
- canonical conflict against approved substrate  
- decision: allow · allow_with_warning · require_review · quarantine · block  

Use `evaluationProfile: "product_deep"` on integrity evaluate for RAG signals, or call product-depth RAG governance directly.

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# **6. Runtime API Surface**

| Endpoint | Purpose |
|----------|---------|
| `POST /substrate/retrieval/filter` | Filter candidate trace IDs by influence + integrity |
| `POST /substrate/integrity/evaluate` | Full integrity path for retrieval signals |
| `GET /tracescript/observability/retrieval-integrity` | Tenant retrieval integrity dashboard view |

Filter responses include **retrieval filter receipts** bound to the receipt ledger.

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# **7. Proof Model**

Retrieval Integrity is proven when:

1. Poisoned RAG chunks are flagged and blocked or quarantined  
2. Revoked traces are excluded from canonical retrieval  
3. Cross-tenant receipt reads fail at API and SQL layers  
4. Filter decisions emit receipts with replay verification  
5. Product-depth RAG events appear in observability views  

See `/proof.html` module ladder and Developers retrieval demo preset.

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# **8. Relationship to Platform Modules**

| Module | Relationship |
|--------|----------------|
| Substrate Integrity Monitor | Parent substrate security — trusted-state formation |
| Policy Corpus Integrity | Policy retrieval and canonical policy authority |
| Memory Firewall | Memory writes after retrieval influence |
| Agent Action Firewall | Action basis must not rely on unfiltered retrieval |
| Receipt Ledger | Filter receipts + replay |

Retrieval Integrity is the **believe-zone gate** between search results and trusted AI context.

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# **9. Buyer Checklist Mapping**

Retrieval Integrity helps answer:

- Can it block cross-customer retrieval?  
- Can it prevent old policy from supporting action?  
- Can it detect when weak information is made to look official through summaries?  
- Can it repair, revoke, or block unsafe information from future use?  

Full checklist: `/evaluation-checklist.html`

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# **10. Deployment Path**

1. Ingest retrieval signals with `targetSubstrate: "rag_store"`  
2. Evaluate with `evaluationProfile: "product_deep"` for RAG depth  
3. Filter candidate traces via `/substrate/retrieval/filter` before prompt assembly  
4. Bind filter receipts; replay on audit  
5. Monitor `v_tracescript_retrieval_integrity` per tenant  

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**TraceScript Retrieval Integrity — safe-to-trust check for everything agents retrieve.**